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Abstract  
Studies based on a cost of illness method frequently assert large social costs from a 
variety of risky activities, the harms from which most typically fall upon the risk-taker 
himself. Many of these costs are inadmissible in a standard economic framework; 
consequently, figures derived by the cost of illness method are not comparable with 
other economic notions of cost and are of very limited policy use. 
While all forms of consumption bring both costs and benefits, not all such costs and 
benefits are socially relevant. Because we expect individuals to discount costs borne 
by others, consumption of products that can have negative health consequences and 
that thereby impose costs via the public health system may also require excise taxes to 
force the internalisation of these otherwise externalised costs.  
Measuring correctly the costs that individuals impose on external parties is an 
important first step in ensuring that tax and regulatory policy is set correctly. 
Unfortunately, adequate assessment of such costs is the exception rather than the rule.  
We here summarise findings from our work1 comparing the social cost estimation 
method used in the public health literature with that used in the economic literature. 
We find the former suffers from a cost-inflating bias. Not only are social costs and 
private costs conflated, but, in important cases, categories of cost are double-counted.  
As exemplar, we analyse studies finding social costs of alcohol in New Zealand of 
$4.8 billion2 and of $15 billion in Australia,3 finding that only a fifth of those figures 
could plausibly be counted as an upper bound measure of actual external, policy-
relevant, social cost. Nevertheless, the figures have been influential in policy debate.  
While we do not wish to diminish the very real harms of alcohol use, it remains 
important that policy be based on sound measures that are comparable across different 
cost areas.  
The economic framework for cost analysis allows us to compare the otherwise 
incommensurable. Stepping too far from that method prevents derived results from 
being useful for policy purposes and instead generates figures more suited to 
advocacy. 
We illustrate the difference between the economic method and the public health 
method as we work through categories of cost found in these two influential policy 
reports. We begin with those tabulated costs that are best viewed as policy-relevant 
from an economic perspective and then move towards those that are generally 
inadmissible in an economic analysis. We then discuss the critical difference between 
marginal and total costs in economic analysis and its relevance for policy. 
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Policy-relevant costs 
Crime and motor-vehicle accidents 
Some drinkers go on to commit crimes, or to cause car accidents, that would not have 
occurred but for intoxication; these costs are imposed by drinkers on others, are 
significant in magnitude, and policy-relevant. Where the economic method and the 
public health method diverge is in determination of causality in crime and in setting 
the boundaries of which costs are policy-relevant among those suffering costs of drink 
driving accidents.  
Both Business and Economic Research Limited (BERL) and Collins & Lapsley (CL) 
use survey methods to assign the proportion of crime attributable to alcohol. In the 
New Zealand case, BERL used an existing survey of prisoners who were asked to 
reveal the extent to which alcohol contributed to their current incarceration. Those 
answering “some”, “a lot”, or “all” were deemed to have committed a crime that 
would not have been committed in the absence of alcohol. Positive responses were 
sorted by category of crime, and that proportion of each crime’s aggregate cost was 
attributed to alcohol.  
CL used two separate pre-existing surveys.4,5 Police detainees indicating that they had 
consumed five or more standard drinks any time in the prior month (three or more for 
women) and that they had consumed any alcohol at all in the 48-hours prior to 
detention were deemed to have committed an alcohol-caused crime if they also 
revealed alcohol dependence through positive answers to three of six indicator 
questions.  
A husband and wife who shared a bottle of wine with dinner the day before 
committing a jewellery heist, and who indicated signs of alcohol dependence in 
survey questions, would be deemed to have committed an alcohol-caused crime. 
Costs of imprisonment are apportioned through use of prisoner self-reports of 
intoxication at the time of committing the offence.  
Neither method is adequate for assessing alcohol’s causal role in crime. Prisoner self-
report of intoxication may be viewed as exculpatory if subsequently attending alcohol 
treatment programmes helps earn early release. In our review of BERL, we 
downgraded their assessed crime costs by a third to remove those answering “some” 
to the survey question; in our review of CL, we noted the grave problems with their 
estimate but did not adjust their figure other than by removing costs attributed to 
forgone prisoner earnings.  
Similarly, costs imposed on others by drink drivers should be tabulated in any 
economic accounting of the costs of alcohol use. But the public health method 
diverges from the economic method in determining which costs count.  
Consider first the case of a drink driver who dies in a single-vehicle accident in his 
own car on a little-used road without incidental property damage to others. The public 
health approach counts as socially relevant the mortality costs falling on the drinker 
himself and the damage to the drinker’s car; in an economic framework, the only 
policy-relevant costs are those imposed on emergency services in responding to the 
accident. 
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Private and external cost 
Why do the two methods so diverge? Economists are not so amoral as to consider it 
irrelevant that someone has tragically died. But measures of private costs borne by 
drink drivers are only economically meaningful if offset by the consumption benefits 
enjoyed by all drinkers who took similar risk and did not have an accident.  
Consider, by analogy, skiing, which would be utterly socially wasteful if we counted 
all of the accident costs suffered by skiers while taking no consideration of that all 
skiers derive at least some enjoyment from their risky activity. And here, from an 
economic perspective, the public health literature goes seriously awry.6  
BERL simply assumes that harmful drinkers enjoy no benefits from their 
consumption;7 they consequently deem all private costs as socially relevant because 
there are no offsetting private benefits. CL take a rhetorically different but 
substantially equivalent approach by assuming any potential market failure in alcohol 
consumption sufficient reason for dismissing all private consumption benefits.8  
Market failures such as imperfect information can result in excess consumption, and 
the excess of costs over benefits for the erroneously consumed alcohol can then count 
as social, but simply assuming away all private benefits because of the potential for 
market failure is completely at odds with standard economic method. We could 
similarly assume that imperfect information in the used car market means nobody 
derives any benefit from buying a vehicle. 
This substantial difference results in the biggest divergence between the public health 
and the economic approach to tabulating the costs of alcohol use. Where public health 
figures include all of the costs drinkers impose upon themselves, the economic 
method would either leave those costs to the side or incorporate them only if 
offsetting private benefits were simultaneously estimated and included.  
Drink-driving costs falling upon those external to the vehicle should be counted as 
policy-relevant from both an economic and a public health perspective. From an 
economic perspective, costs falling upon the driver should be deemed private and 
irrelevant for policy unless weight is given to benefits enjoyed by the set of drivers 
taking similar risk but who suffer no adverse outcome.  
Whether those inside the vehicle with the drinker bear public or private costs is less 
clear. A strict interpretation of the economic approach would hold that passengers’ 
agreement to ride with an intoxicated driver makes them party to the driver’s 
decision; resultant costs or benefits they bear can then hardly be deemed external.9 If 
we wished to take a less strict line, we would again wish to count the benefits enjoyed 
by the passengers of drink drivers who do not suffer accidents against the costs falling 
on those who do.  
It is easy to scoff at the potential existence of such benefits, but it puts a heavy thumb 
on the scale if we simply assume them away. In any case, the mortality costs of drink 
driving accidents falling on those inside the drinker’s vehicle other than the driver are 
a small proportion of overall tabulated mortality costs. 
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Health care costs 
In a strict economic framework, the majority of alcohol-related costs borne by the 
public health system would be considered a transfer rather than as a true economic 
cost; only the identity of the payer changes rather than the existence of the cost.  
If health care costs fell privately, it is likely that drinkers would take more care in 
avoiding such costs;10 the increase of net costs under a public health system as 
compared to a private system can be considered a real external cost of alcohol use, 
though whether it should be tallied as a consequence of alcohol consumption or as a 
consequence of a policy decision that the tax system should be used to defray the 
health costs of drinking is, at best, debatable.11  
We assumed that policy’s intention is to offset transfer costs with excise taxes and so 
included all of these transfer costs as policy relevant.  
CL assessed health care costs through alcohol-attributable aetiological fractions 
applied to total medical and hospital expenditures in Australia. For some disorders, 
costs to the public health system are reduced because of alcohol consumption – the 
burden of heart disease is lessened by alcohol consumption while the system bears 
greater costs of cirrhosis. While we questioned some of their fractions, our report 
excised only that portion of health care expenditures borne privately by drinkers using 
private health care. 
BERL’s method began with CL’s aetiological tables, but set equal to zero any 
disorder’s fraction where CL had determined that alcohol reduced rather than 
increased health costs; BERL assumed that harmful drinking, by definition, cannot 
improve outcomes on any health dimension. This is clearly out of step with the bulk 
of the epidemiological literature that finds, in particular, reductions in coronary heart 
disease even among heavy drinkers.12  
Overall mortality is certainly increased by heavy drinking, but the net effect is smaller 
than BERL estimates. We were unable to reverse-engineer BERL’s figures to impose 
CL’s fractions; we instead deducted only that portion of the health care bill paid 
privately by the drinker. 
Productivity and absenteeism 
If a drinker dies early, he is no longer earning income or producing output. 
Economists typically find that workers are roughly paid their incremental contribution 
to the firm’s bottom line—their marginal product. In that case, the only economically 
relevant productivity cost that results is the search cost borne by his employer in 
finding a replacement. If the death is unanticipated, that search cost is policy relevant. 
If the employee’s heavy alcohol consumption were well known, these cost risks 
would be already factored into the employee’s pay.  
Similarly, most taxpayers contribute less than their service cost to the government 
under progressive taxation regimes where high income earners pay the greatest 
portion of the cost of government services.13 Any forgone tax revenue then needs to 
be weighed against reduced government liability for superannuation and other 
benefits that impose cost at the margin. By way of example, the alcoholic who dies 
prematurely neither contributes tax revenues nor consumes subsidised rest-home care.  
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Forgone wages plus employer hiring costs then constitute an upper bound on gross 
productivity losses consequent to premature mortality; policy relevant costs will be 
those borne unexpectedly by the employer. Both BERL and CL instead effectively 
take per capita Gross Domestic Product as measure of forgone production – a figure 
much larger than the aggregate wage bill as GDP includes payments to capital. The 
difference is substantial—BERL adds over $650 million to headline costs by using 
per capita GDP rather than wages.  
There are three substantial problems with this approach:  
• First, where the death is incurred by the drinker, costs are properly considered 
internal rather than external; only increased employer search costs are 
plausibly external.  
• Second, using per capita GDP rather than wages as measure of forgone output 
requires very strong assumptions about worker irreplaceabililty and about 
capital-labour complementarity—a method rejected by the World Health 
Organization (WHO).14  
• Finally, both BERL and CL go on later to include intangible costs of loss of 
life. As we will discuss in the ‘Intangible costs’ section, below, using both 
measures together constitutes double-counting.  
We consequently made very large adjustments to estimated social costs of 
productivity losses and absenteeism.  
Intangible costs 
Premature death is costly; people value their own lives. Pain and suffering associated 
with alcohol-related disability and disease are real. Intangible costs falling on the 
victims of alcohol-caused crime and the victims of drink drivers should be tallied in 
an economic measure of alcohol’s social cost, but costs borne by the drinker can be 
included only if taken net of private benefits; estimating those private benefits would 
be a significant task.  
We consequently followed the standard economic approach of excluding privately-
borne costs. But both reports suffer from an additional substantial problem: private 
costs are significantly overestimated by inclusion of both intangible costs of life lost 
and forgone productivity.  
Value of statistical life estimates used by both CL and BERL are inclusive figures; 
they do not provide a value of statistical life net of productivity. CL use Australian 
Bureau of Transport Economics figures on the Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) based 
on willingness to pay for incremental safety improvements. That measure weighs all 
of the benefits from lives saved by those safety initiatives. Adding wages to the VSL 
measure then is double-counting.  
BERL uses New Zealand Ministry of Transport figures that similarly are inclusive of 
productivity losses with premature mortality. Indeed, the Ministry of Transport 
tabulation of the cost of road accidents excludes forgone earnings among those killed 
in road accidents for precisely this reason.15  
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BERL therefore double-counts.16 BERL counts $1.52 billion (CL: $4.5 billion) in 
intangible costs of lives lost and $1.5 billion (CL: $3.5 billion) in forgone production, 
but a substantial portion of the latter is included in the former. It makes little 
difference to the bottom line in an economic costing as both types of cost are largely 
excluded as borne by the drinker, but it does matter if we wish an accurate assessment 
of costs borne privately by drinkers. 
Resources used in abusive consumption 
Is it a social cost that a drinker spends $10 on a bottle of wine? Both BERL and CL 
deem drinkers’ expenditures on alcohol to be a social cost. This constitutes a sixth of 
CL’s headline social cost figure, and fifteen percent of BERL’s, but none of it is 
admissible in an economic measure of social cost. The counting of such expenditure 
as social cost is a curious by-product of assuming all private benefits away. 
Summing up 
Considering only policy-relevant costs reduced measured social cost substantially. 
Some $967 million of BERL’s $4.8 billion could be considered external and policy-
relevant as a first cut, though we note substantial problems remain uncorrected, 
including overestimation of health care costs through their adjustment to CL’s 
aetiological tables.  
In CL’s case, some $3.8 billion of their $15 billion can be considered potentially 
external, though we also note grave uncorrected problems in assessment of causality 
in the crime. Both figures are close to collected aggregate alcohol excise tax takes. 
Margins and averages 
In his address to the New Zealand Police, Sir Geoffrey Palmer17 contrasted BERL’s 
measured social cost of alcohol with the aggregate excise tax take and took the 
difference as sufficient justification for large increases in taxation and regulation. 
Even leaving aside that the difference between the two figures drops considerably 
when normal economic method is applied to BERL’s figure, differences between 
aggregate social cost and the excise tax take do not necessarily inform discussion of 
appropriate tax and regulation. Rather, we need to assess the marginal effect of a tax 
increase.  
Alcohol excise taxation is necessarily linear in alcohol consumption while external 
costs are more plausibly J-shaped; when aggregate excise taxes entirely offset 
external harms, they necessarily impose too great a cost on moderate drinkers and too 
small a cost on harmful drinkers.18 Policy then must weigh the costs imposed on 
moderate drinkers against the harms avoided when heavy drinkers curtail 
consumption.  
By the best existing estimates,19 a 10% increase in the price of alcohol induces heavy 
drinkers to curb their use by only 2.8% while cutting average consumption by 4.4%. 
If benefits to moderate drinkers matter, then we can do net harm by increasing excise 
taxes if the cost imposed on moderate drinkers, multiplied by the large number of 
moderate drinkers, exceeds the aggregate harm avoided by the smaller reduction in 
heavy drinkers’ consumption. Measures targeting heavy drinkers might be preferred 
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on economic grounds, though any measure would need evaluating on its own merits at 
the margin. 
In short, differences between aggregate social cost and the aggregate excise tax take 
tell us little about whether alcohol taxation or regulation is too strong or too liberal. 
Instead, we need to assess whether net marginal harm is reduced by any new measure, 
while taking seriously the burden those measures impose on drinkers who do not 
cause harm. And, ideally, we would attempt to devise policy instruments that curtail 
harms imposed by heavy drinkers at lowest collateral cost to moderate drinkers. 
Conclusion 
It is easy to generate arbitrarily large figures purporting to tabulate the social costs of 
any activity if we use a method that never counts benefits while counting all of the 
costs, and some of those costs twice. While the resulting figure is useful for 
generating headlines that spur voter demands for action, it otherwise does little to 
inform policy development.  
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